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I. INTRODUCTION

Boilerplate. The word elicits cringes from judges and lawyers alike.
To see it is to understand the reaction. Stock, one-size-fits-all blocks of
print inserted with little thought as to whether any, much less all, of the
verbiage is warranted. Boilerplate has no place in civil discovery. It is the
antithesis of what lawyers are supposed to do in making or responding to
discovery requests. Boilerplate isn’t just empty content; it is the enemy of
content. Each word of boilerplate reduces the clarity, value, and
usefulness of the interrogatories, requests, responses, and objections it
accompanies.
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Some judges have been saying for a long time that boilerplate is
improper and will be ignored. 1 Yet boilerplate is found in almost all
discovery requests and responses. If anything, lawyers seem to use it even
more today than in the past. 2 Modern word-processing programs make
cutting and pasting boilerplate virtually effortless. Fear (also known as
“CYA”) makes it even more attractive. Boilerplate, it seems, has a

* Gene and Elaine Edwards Family Chair in Law, University of Oklahoma College of Law.
** Chief Judge, United States District Court, Southern District of Texas. We want to thank the
University of Akron School of Law for hosting this symposium and for inviting us to participate.
Throughout this Article, we make many unfootnoted assertions from our combined decades of
observation and experience. Some are based on Judge Rosenthal’s 25-plus years of experience on the
bench. Some are based on what we heard and learned from lawyers and judges across the country as
co-moderators of the 17-city “Rules Amendment Roadshow,” sponsored by the American Bar
Association Section of Litigation and the Duke Center for Judicial Studies. See Lee H. Rosenthal &
Steven Gensler, A Report from the Proportionality Roadshow, 100 JUDICATURE 14 (2016) (describing
the roadshow and summarizing key findings). Some are based on our experiences as rulemakers.
Judge Rosenthal served as Chair of the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure from
2007 to 2011 and served as a member of and later Chair of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules
from 1996 to 2007. Professor Gensler served as a member of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules
from 2005 to 2011. The opinions and conclusions stated in this Article are our own and should not be
attributed to any of the committees on which we have served.
1. See, e.g., St. Paul Reinsurance Co., LTD. v. Commercial Fin. Corp., 198 F.R.D. 508, 51113 (N.D. Iowa 2000) (extended criticism of boilerplate objections); Walker v. Lakewood Condo.
Owners Ass’n, 186 F.R.D. 584, 587 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (“Boilerplate, generalized objections are
inadequate and tantamount to not making any objection at all.”); Athridge v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co.,
184 F.R.D. 181, 190 (D.D.C. 1998) (“Aetna includes the standard, boilerplate ‘general objections’
section in its responses to plaintiffs’ request for production which includes blanket objections as to
relevance, burdensomeness and attorney-client privilege and work product privilege. Such general
objections do not comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b) and courts disfavor them.”); In re Aircrash
Disaster Near Roselawn, Ind. Oct. 31, 1994, 172 F.R.D. 295, 306-07 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (“The aircraft
defendants have alleged pat, generic, non-specific objections to each document request, repeating the
familiar boilerplate phrase that each and every request is ‘vague, overly broad, unduly burdensome,
and seeks information that is not relevant . . .’ The[se] objections are inconsistent with both the letter
and the spirit of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”); Obiajulu v. City of Rochester, Dep’t of Law,
166 F.R.D. 293, 295 (W.D. N.Y. 1996) (“Such pat, generic, non-specific objections, intoning the
same boilerplate language, are inconsistent with both the letter and spirit of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.”); Roseberg v. Johns-Manville Corp., 85 F.R.D. 292, 296 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (“To voice a
successful objection to an interrogatory, GAF cannot simply intone this familiar litany. Rather, GAF
must show specifically how . . . each interrogatory is not relevant or how each question is overly
broad, burdensome or oppressive.”).
2. We are not aware of empirical studies on the incidence of boilerplate in discovery. We base
this assertion on our own experiences and what we have heard and learned from talking with judges
and lawyers around the country. We are certainly not alone in the belief that the boilerplate problem
seems to be getting worse. See Chief Justice Menis E. Ketchum II, Impeding Discovery: Eliminating
Worthless Interrogatory Instructions and Objections, W.VA. LAW. 18, 20 (June 2012) (“More and
more, I see interrogatory answers that assert some vague or gratuitous objection and then say ‘without
waiving the objection, we will state the following. . . .’”).
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toughness and resilience worthy of the steel plate from which it takes its
name. 3
In the last several years, more judges have put down their proverbial
feet, warning lawyers of sanctions if they persist in their boilerplate
practices. 4 The judicial pushback received a boost from the 2015
amendments to the Civil Rules. Several judges have cited the amendments
as signaling and supporting the need for renewed efforts to combat
boilerplate discovery practices, as part of the larger effort to achieve
proportionate, sensible discovery. 5
This Article explores the resurgent anti-boilerplate movement. We
begin with a look at the 2015 amendments to see why they have spurred
some judges to take a stronger stand against the use of boilerplate in
discovery. We then turn to recent decisions that have taken the strongest
stance against boilerplate, examining the claim that boilerplate is not just
an annoying bad habit but a serious form of discovery misconduct that
exposes the lawyers who use it (and their clients) to significant sanctions.
We then consider what more can or needs to be done. Boilerplate has
persisted despite decades of near-universal disapproval. Why? Will the
threat—or reality—of sanctions be enough to get lawyers to break their
addiction to boilerplate? And will judges be willing to engage in the fight
to end it?
In the pages that follow, we develop the following conclusions. First,
the 2015 amendments very much speak to, and take aim at, boilerplate in
discovery. The amendments to Rule 34 specifically target boilerplate
objections. What is often overlooked is that the 2015 amendments also
take aim at the equally pernicious practice of boilerplate requests. Second,
the resurgent judicial condemnation of boilerplate discovery practices is
real, well-founded, and broader than many realize. Boilerplate objections
are insufficient under Rules 33 and 34, expose the user to expense shifting
3. The term “boilerplate” was coined to describe the rolled steel used to make the industrial
water boilers that helped fuel the industrial revolution. In the early 1900s, however, people started
using the term to describe the curved metal plates pre-stamped with generic, ready-to-print stories
sent to multiple small local newspapers. The term became pejorative because the stories had no
relevance or connection to the local readers. Their main value was to the newspaper, which could
expand—perhaps “pad” is a better word—content with minimal effort and cost simply by adding the
pre-stamped plates to the printing-press run. See generally Boilerplate, WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boilerplate_text [https://perma.cc/S6XH-HZ2E] (last visited Feb. 21,
2018); Boilerplate, DICTONARY.COM, http://www.dictionary.com/browse/boilerplate (last visited
Feb. 21, 2018); Boilerplate, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
boilerplate (last visited Feb. 21, 2018).
4. See infra Section I.A.
5. See, e.g., Fischer v. Forrest, No. 14 Civ. 1304, 2017 WL 773694, at *1 (S.D. N.Y. Feb. 28,
2017).
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under Rule 37(a)(5), and presumptively violate Rule 26(g). That much
seems universally understood. But the boilerplate problem often begins
earlier. Stock discovery requests—the questions a lawyer has included in
each case since the Carter administration without thinking about whether
the requests fit the needs of that case—almost by definition run afoul of
Rule 26(b)’s proportionality requirement. The problem compounds when
boilerplate requests are met with boilerplate objections. The circle must
be broken at both ends.
That doesn’t mean, however, that discovery must be hand-crafted
from scratch in every case. To the contrary, standardized discovery
mechanisms can be affirmatively helpful—so long as they are designed
and used to foster efficient and proportional discovery, not to frustrate it.
“Pattern” is not synonymous with boilerplate. The discovery protocols
developed for adverse-employment and Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)
actions, and being developed for other categories of cases, provide a
roadmap for how discovery can be both tailored and routine at the same
time.
So what can be done? Many of the factors that contributed to the
spread of boilerplate are structural features of our discovery system that
are not realistic candidates for change. What can be changed is the culture
of acceptance. It is up to the judiciary—both individually, with each judge
managing his or her docket, and as a group—to take a loud and visible
stand against boilerplate. Judges must make it clear to lawyers that
boilerplate requests and objections are no longer “business as usual,” will
not be tolerated, and will instead result in sanctions. Lawyers have been
conditioned over the years to believe that they can use boilerplate without
adverse consequence. Lawyers will continue to use boilerplate in
discovery as long as judges let them. A few judges making examples of a
few unlucky lawyers will not turn the tide. It needs to be a predictable
consequence. If enough judges communicate the message, lawyers will
get it. Then, but only then, will the practice change to achieve what the
rules already require.
II. WHAT DO THE 2015 AMENDMENTS SAY ABOUT THE USE OF
BOILERPLATE IN DISCOVERY?
When people think about the 2015 amendments to the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, 6 the word “boilerplate” probably doesn’t come to
6. See SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (2015). For a full discussion of the 2015 amendments and the
accompanying Committee Notes, see STEVEN S. GENSLER, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, THE 2015
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mind. The “proportionality” amendments, or perhaps the “spoliation”
amendment, is usually used to describe the 2015 rule changes, not the
“anti-boilerplate” amendments. But several of the 2015 rule changes are,
by design or effect, anti-boilerplate amendments. The 2015 amendments
most visibly target boilerplate in the Rule 34 amendments, which directly
address objections to document requests. The 2015 amendments’
emphasis on tailored discovery and proportionality is also part of the
effort, directed at the problems caused by boilerplate discovery requests.
A.

Boilerplate Objections

The 2015 amendments address the longstanding problem of
boilerplate objections in two ways. One change to Rule 34 directly and
obviously targets boilerplate objections. Another change to Rule 34 is, on
the surface, not directed at boilerplate objections, but it operates to
discourage them indirectly by stripping away a seeming tactical advantage
parties often used boilerplate objections to attain.
The obvious and direct attack on boilerplate is the Rule 34(b)
amendment requiring parties to state their objections “with specificity.”7
This requirement is new to the rule’s text but not to practice. In 1993, Rule
33 was amended to (among other things) require interrogatory objections
to be “stated with specificity.” 8 No similar specificity language was added
to Rule 34 at that time. Nonetheless, judges had read a specificity
requirement into both Rule 33 and Rule 34 long before 1993, 9 and they
continued to do so for Rule 34 after 1993. 10 Indeed, many lawyers—and
even many judges—were surprised to learn that the text of Rule 34 didn’t
have a specificity requirement before 2015. But while lawyers and judges
may have assumed a specificity requirement in Rule 34, few lawyers
invoked it and few judges enforced it. The 2015 amendments to Rule 34
tried to change this by making the specificity requirement in Rule 34 clear.
As the accompanying Committee Note explains, “[t]his provision adopts
AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, § 1.21(1) (Matt Bender, 3d ed. 2015)
[hereinafter GENSLER, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE].
7. FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment.
8. FED. R. CIV. P. 33 advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment.
9. See, e.g., Roseberg v. Johns-Manville Corp., 85 F.R.D. 292, 296 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (“To voice
a successful objection to an interrogatory, GAF cannot simply intone this familiar litany. Rather, GAF
must show specifically how . . . each interrogatory is not relevant or how each question is overly
broad, burdensome or oppressive.”).
10. See, e.g., Athridge v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., 184 F.R.D. 181, 191 (D.D.C. 1998);
Pulsecard, Inc. v. Discover Card Services, Inc., 168 F.R.D. 295, 303 (D. Kan. 1996) (“Although Fed.
R. Civ. P. 34 . . . provides no similar language with respect to specificity and waiver of objections, no
reason exists to distinguish between interrogatories and requests for production.”).
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the language of Rule 33(b)(4), eliminating any doubt that less specific
objections might be suitable under Rule 34.” 11
The 2015 amendments also include an indirect and less obvious
attack on boilerplate objections. The amendment to Rule 34(c) requires
parties to state whether they are actually withholding responsive
documents on the basis of their stated objections. On the surface, this
appears targeted at a slightly different problem than boilerplate. During
the 2010 Duke Conference on Civil Litigation, one of the participants,
Daniel Girard, called attention to a problem that he routinely encountered
in his practice as a plaintiff-side complex litigation lawyer and that he had
written about in an article submitted in conjunction with the Conference.12
Girard described often receiving Rule 34 responses that began with a long
list of generalized objections and ended with the statement that some
documents would be produced “subject to” those objections. 13 The
problem, he explained, is that there was no way for a lawyer receiving that
response to know whether any responsive materials were actually being
withheld; if so, what was produced and what was not; and the specific
reason for not producing what was withheld. 14 His proposed solution was
to amend Rule 34 to require responding parties to state whether any
responsive documents were being withheld on the basis of a specific
objection. 15 The Advisory Committee agreed, leading to the 2015
amendment requiring that “[a]n objection must state whether any
responsive materials are being withheld on the basis of that objection.” 16
This amendment is intended in part to provide clarity about the effect
of the objections that are made. The Advisory Committee hoped to “end
the confusion that frequently arises when a producing party states several
objections and still produces information, leaving the requesting party
uncertain whether any relevant and responsive information has been
withheld on the basis of the objections.” 17 But the amendment is also an
attack on the use of boilerplate objections. If a lawyer is allowed to state
generalized and nonspecific boilerplate objections to a discovery request
11. FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment.
12. See Daniel C. Girard & Todd I. Espinosa, Limiting Evasive Discovery: A Proposal for
Three Cost-Saving Amendments to the Federal Rules, 87 DEN. U. L. REV. 473 (2010). Dan Girard
was a member of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee at the time and participated as a panelist at the
Duke Conference. See 2010 CIVIL LITIGATION CONFERENCE, http://www.uscourts.gov/rulespolicies/records-and-archives-rules-committees/special-projects-rules-committees/2010-civil
[http://perma.cc/96DW-9CN4] (last visited Feb. 15, 2018).
13. Girard & Espinosa, supra note 12, at 482.
14. Id. at 482-83.
15. Id. at 483.
16. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(c).
17. FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment.
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and is allowed to respond “subject to” those boilerplate objections, that
lawyer and client get a significant tactical advantage. They appear to be
fulfilling the rule obligation to respond, but it is an illusion. The
responding party has effectively concealed both its views on the propriety
of the request and the actions taken in response. Was the entire request
objectionable, or just part? If only a part was objectionable, which part,
and why? Was the information called for by the not-objectionable part
produced? If not, why not? In effect, the hedge language of “subject to”
or “to the extent that” is a mask. The boilerplate makes the nonresponse
look like a legitimate response. Obfuscation is itself obscured. If the mask
is removed by making parties say what they did (or didn’t do) on the basis
of the boilerplate objections they assert, one advantage of using the
boilerplate objections is removed. As Girard correctly observed,
“[r]equiring that the responding party specify whether documents have
been withheld in response to a request would discourage the use of
boilerplate objections.” 18
While the word “boilerplate” doesn’t appear in the text of the
amendments to Rule 34 or the accompanying Committee Note,19 the
Advisory Committee understood this change as part of its attack on using
boilerplate objections. During the rulemaking process, the connection
between “subject to” responses and boilerplate objections was repeatedly
recognized. 20 In his memorandum forwarding the 2015 proposed
amendments to the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure, Judge David Campbell, then Chair of the Civil Rules Advisory
Committee and later Chair of the Standing Committee on the Rules of
Practice and Procedure, explained that one purpose of the Rule 34
amendments was to address “the use of broad, boilerplate objections that
provide little information about the true reason a party is objecting.” 21

18. Girard & Espinosa, supra note 12, at 482-83.
19. Ironically, it does appear in the Committee Note accompanying the amendments to Rule
26, which warns lawyers against making boilerplate “proportionality” objections. See FED. R. CIV. P.
26 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment.
20. See Duke Conf. Subcomm. Menu: Rule Proposals, at 9, in ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL
RULES
357
(2010),
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/CV2010-11.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G3KP-XFZE]; Conf. Subcomm. March Agenda, at 4, in ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON
CIVIL RULES 275 (2011), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/CV2011-04.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C9N4-BHUY]; Duke Conf. Subcomm. Rule Sketches, at 30-31, in ADVISORY
COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 404-05 (2012), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/
files/fr_import/CV2012-03.pdf [https://perma.cc/39BN-XKAH].
21. SUMMARY OF THE REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON RULES OF
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 85 (2014), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/ST092014.pdf [https://perma.cc/537S-B3LH]. See also Judge David G. Campbell, New Rules, New
Opportunities, 99 JUDICATURE 19, 22 (Winter 2015) (“These amendments should eliminate . . . the
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To be clear, the boilerplate objections the Advisory Committee
targeted with the 2015 amendments—and the objections addressed in this
Article—are the broad, vague, and unsupported objections asserting
burden, relevance, or other scope-related grounds. The Advisory
Committee was not targeting—and we are not addressing—boilerplate
objections based on privilege or work-product protection. There have
been problems with boilerplate privilege and work-product objections, but
the rules were amended in 1991 and 1993 to provide a mechanism to
address them.
Until 1991, the rules did not specifically address how to raise claims
of privilege or work-product protection. 22 Many, but not all, courts filled
that void with an ad hoc solution that required parties to make privilege
and work-product objections specifically and to provide a log listing the
items being withheld and why. This solution adopted the requirement
known as a “Vaughn Index,” developed in the context of FOIA requests,
and applied it to discovery. 23 But complaints about “general” and
“blanket” assertions of privilege and work-product objections continued.
In response, the Advisory Committee developed proposals that would
require both parties responding to discovery requests and nonparties
responding to subpoenas to expressly assert claims of privilege and workproduct and to provide enough information for the requesting party to
assess the sufficiency of the claims.
The Committee first adopted an amendment for subpoenas in 1991
with the addition of Rule 45(d)(2), 24 and in 1993 extended it to party
discovery responses with the addition of Rule 26(b)(5). 25 That section
currently provides:
When a party withholds information otherwise discoverable by claiming
that the information is privileged or subject to protection as trialuse of broad, boilerplate objections that provide little information about the true reason a party is
objecting to a document request.”).
22. See 8 WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2016.1, at 320 (2010). See
also Hon. John M. Facciola & Jonathan M. Redgrave, Asserting and Challenging Privilege Claims in
Modern Litigation: The Facciola-Redgrave Framework, 4 FED. CTS. L. REV. 19, 24-27 (2009)
(discussing districts that implemented a privilege log requirement by local rule).
23. See, e.g., Harper v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 138 F.R.D. 655, 664 (S.D. Ind. 1991); Snowden
v. Connaught Labs., Inc., 137 F.R.D. 325, 334 (D. Kan. 1991); United States v. Exxon Corp., 87
F.R.D. 624, 637-38 (D.D.C. 1980).
24. See FED. R. CIV. P. 45 advisory committee’s note to 1991 amendment.
25. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment. The Rule 45 and
Rule 26 provisions were developed simultaneously by the Advisory Committee with the intent that
they would be implemented at the same time, but the Rule 26 provision was delayed by two years
when the Supreme Court withdrew it from the package of proposals it forwarded to Congress in 1991.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 45 advisory committee’s note to 1991 amendment.
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preparation material, the party must: (i) expressly make the claim; and
(ii) describe the nature of the documents, communications, or tangible
things not produced or disclosed—and do so in a manner that, without
revealing information itself privileged or protected, will enable other
parties to assess the claim. 26

When parties are responding to document requests, they customarily
satisfy Rule 26(b)(5)(A) by providing a privilege log. 27
Nothing in the 2015 amendments disturbed practice under Rule
26(b)(5)(A), which continued to govern how parties assert objections
based on privilege and work-product protection. There was no need in
2015 for the rulemakers to impose a “specificity” requirement for
privilege or work-product objections, or to enact a new requirement for
parties to state whether they were withholding anything on the basis of
privilege or work-product objections. Rule 26(b)(5) already imposed
those obligations in ways that are at least as demanding as what Rule 34
now requires for burden and scope-based objections. Indeed, the Advisory
Committee was careful to make clear that the Rule 34 requirement that
parties state whether they are withholding any responsive materials on the
basis of an objection is not as demanding as the obligation imposed by
Rule 26(b)(5)(A) when privilege or work-product objections are raised.
As the Committee Note explains:
The producing party does not need to provide a detailed description or
log of all documents withheld, but does need to alert other parties to the
fact that documents have been withheld and thereby facilitate an
informed discussion of the objection. An objection that states the limits
that have controlled the search for responsive and relevant materials
qualifies as a statement that the materials have been ‘withheld.’ 28

26.
27.

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5)(A).
See STEVEN S. GENSLER, FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: RULES AND
COMMENTARY 766 (West 2018) [hereinafter GENSLER, RULES AND COMMENTARY] (“In the context
of document discovery, it has become customary for the party claiming privilege or work-product
protection to produce a privilege log that contains the facts and circumstances sufficient to establish
each element of the claimed privilege for each document.”).
28. FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment. Ironically, the
rulemakers seem to have anticipated this mechanism in the Committee Notes to the 1993 amendment
adding Rule 26(b)(5). The Committee Note describes a situation where a request seeks documents for
a twenty-year period, but the responding party believes it should have to go back only three years.
FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment. The question at issue was whether
the party would waive any claim of privilege as to the documents it did not intend to review at that
time because they were outside the three-year period. The Committee Note explains that the
responding party “should make its objection to the breadth of the request and, with respect to the
documents generated in that three-year period, produce the unprivileged documents and describe
those withheld under the claim of privilege. If the court later rules that documents for a seven-year
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The 2015 amendment tries to avoid requiring an onerous, expensive,
detailed privilege log, opting instead for a more functional and practical
approach.
That is not to say that parties invariably meet their obligations under
Rule 26(b)(5). To the frustration of judges and opposing counsel, lawyers
still sometimes make insufficient “boilerplate” privilege and workproduct objections. 29 Though neither Rule 26(b)(5) nor Rule 34 specify
the consequences of failing to make proper privilege or work-product
objections, the courts consistently hold that a possible consequence is
waiver of the privilege or work-product protection. 30 As discussed later,
waiver can be a problematic sanction for insufficiently-stated burden or
scope-based objections because, if the request was in fact too broad or too
burdensome, then waiver of the objections results in discovery extending
to matters and materials outside the boundaries of relevance and
proportionality. 31 That problem does not exist when claims of privilege or
work-production protection are waived, however, since the effect of this
waiver is not to expand discovery beyond the proper scope, but rather to
require the production of materials within the scope of discovery that
otherwise could have been held back. This is yet another reason to keep
practice under Rule 26(b)(5) separate from practice involving burden or
scope-based objections.

period are properly discoverable, the documents for the additional four years should then be either
produced (if not privileged) or described (if claimed to be privileged).” Id. Viewing this scenario
through the lens of the 2015 amendments, it is clear that what the Committee Note is describing is a
scope objection that satisfies what is now Rule 34(b)(2(C) by making clear that the response goes
back only three years, joined with a privilege objection that must independently satisfy Rule
26(b)(5)(A) for the three-year period for which a response is being made, subject to having to expand
the response and provide a privilege log for any additional periods the court later determines to be
within the proper scope of discovery.
29. In our experience, the biggest problem with privilege and work-product objections isn’t
that they are made in boilerplate fashion but that they are made too broadly, sometimes out of a fear
of waiver should something slip through the cracks. See GENSLER, RULES AND COMMENTARY, supra
note 27, at 732 (discussing how fear of waiver can lead to extravagant privilege review efforts). The
2008 enactment of Federal Rule of Evidence 502 represented a major effort to combat that problem
by limiting the circumstances in which waiver may be found and by providing a mechanism for the
court to enter a non-waiver order. See FED. R. EVID. 502; see also Explanatory Note on Evidence Rule
502 Prepared by the Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules.
30. See, e.g., Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist. of Mont.,
408 F.3d 1142, 1149 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. British American Tobacco (Investments) Ltd.,
387 F.3d 884, 890-91 (D.C. Cir. 2004). See generally GENSLER, RULES AND COMMENTARY, supra
note 27, at 771-73 (discussing case law on privilege waiver). The Committee Note to the 1993
amendment to Rule 26 states that withholding materials without giving the notice required by
subsection (b)(5) “may be viewed as a waiver of the privilege or protection.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26
advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment.
31. See infra text accompanying notes 125-127.
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In summary, the 2015 amendments to Rule 34 target boilerplate
burden and scope-based objections in two ways. First, they enshrine in
rule text the requirement that objections to document requests be made
with specificity. Second, they require parties to state whether they are
actually withholding materials on the basis of their objections, so
responding parties cannot hide behind evasive “subject to” objections. So
far, so good. But more is needed to help alleviate the costs, burden, and
delays of discovery. Fortunately, more is provided.
B.

Boilerplate Requests

Most of the case law and commentary on boilerplate discovery
focuses on objections. 32 But the problem often starts earlier, with the
discovery requests themselves. Too often, lawyers endlessly recycle their
stock interrogatories and document requests—the ones that almost always
have the dreaded words “any and all” repeated over and over—sometimes
doing nothing more than changing the names of the parties and the dates

32. See, e.g., St. Paul Reinsurance Co., LTD. v. Commercial Financial Corp., 198 F.R.D. 508
(N.D. Iowa 2000), Athridge v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., 184 F.R.D. 181 (D.D.C. 1998), In re Aircrash
Disaster Near Roselawn, Ind. Oct. 31, 1994, 172 F.R.D. 295 (N.D. Ill. 1997), Obiajulu v. City of
Rochester, Dep’t of Law, 166 F.R.D. 293 (W.D. N.Y. 1996), and Roseberg v. Johns-Manville Corp.,
85 F.R.D. 292 (E.D. Pa. 1980). For a sampling of the recent commentary from lawyers about the
problem of boilerplate objections and the recent judicial pushback, see Andrew Pepper, The Death of
Boilerplate Discovery Objections in Federal Court, CASE TEXT (Mar. 21, 2017),
https://casetext.com/posts/bench-slapped-the-death-of-boilerplate-discovery-objections
[https://perma.cc/FQP9-QMFS]; Shannon McClure & Kristen Ashe, No More General Objections?
How Two Words Changed the Discovery Landscape, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (Aug. 24, 2017),
https://www.law.com/thelegalintelligencer/almID/1202796379681/No-More-General-ObjectionsHow-Two-Words-Changed-the-Discovery-Landscape/?slreturn=20180117113503
[https://perma.cc/DP52-VBXW]; Jeffery Kruse, Federal Judges Blow Their Stacks Over Boilerplate
(May
19,
2017),
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/
Objections,
MONDAQ
591010/Civil+Law/Federal+Judges+Blow+Their+Stacks+Over+Boilerplate+Objections
[https://perma.cc/4DZU-DSHM]; Michael Lowry, Seriously, Boilerplate Objections Are a Bad Idea,
COMPELLING DISCOVERY (Mar. 20, 2017), https://www.compellingdiscovery.com/?p=4366
[https://perma.cc/8RTT-53HX]; Nicholas J. Brannick, Courts Make Clear that General Objections
are Generally Inappropriate, COLE SHOTZ P.C. BANKRUPTCY AND RESTRUCTURING LAW (Apr. 24,
2017),
https://www.csbankruptcyblog.com/2017/04/articles/bankruptcy-litigation/courts-makeclear-general-objections-generally-inappropriate/ [https://perma.cc/BS72-6HST]; Erin Louise
Palmer, Boilerplate Discovery Objections May Result in Waiver, AM. BAR ASS’N LITIG. NEWS (June
14, 2017), https://www.americanbar.org/publications/litigation-news/top-stories/2017/boilerplatediscovery-objections-may-result-in-waiver.html [https://perma.cc/3T4D-PTTT]; David Goldhaber &
David Ross, Federal Judges Are Tired of “Stock” Discovery Objections, LAW360 (May 3, 2017),
https://www.law360.com/articles/919639/federal-judges-are-tired-of-stock-discovery-objections
[https://perma.cc/VZ8J-9YQB]; Tracy DiFillippo, Specific Objections Succeed under Discovery Rule
Amendments, 42 NO. 2 ABA SECTION OF LITIGATION 28 (Winter 2017); Stanley P. Santire, Discovery
Objections Abuse in Federal Courts, 54-AUG. HOUS. LAW. 24 (July/Aug. 2016).
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(and sometimes not even doing that). That too is a form of boilerplate, a
form that the 2015 amendments seek to end.
The 2015 amendments are, in large part, the culmination of work
undertaken after the 2010 conference at the Duke University Law School
to assess whether the existing rules scheme was meeting the goals set forth
in Rule 1—the “just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action.” 33 In their report to the Chief Justice following the Duke
Conference, the Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules and the Standing
Committee stated that those attending the Conference—plaintiff and
defense lawyers from public and private practice; judges, state and
federal, trial and appellate; and academics—found much to disagree
about. But a strong consensus emerged on a few central points. As the
Advisory Committee put it in its Report to the Chief Justice: “What is
needed can be described, in two words—cooperation and
proportionality—and one phrase—sustained, active, hands-on judicial
case management.” 34 Over the next several years, the Advisory
Committee explored specific rule amendment proposals designed to
further these goals.
Boilerplate discovery requests and responses are at odds with three
of the 2015 amendments’ major reform efforts: (1) making proportionality
an explicit limit on the scope of discovery; (2) requiring lawyers to take
the Rule 26(f) discovery planning conference seriously; and (3)
encouraging judges to engage in more active and earlier case—and
discovery—management. 35 Stock sets of discovery requests, sent in every
case without thought to whether the information and documents sought
are in fact needed for the particular case, let alone worth the cost of getting
for that case, are inherently at odds with proportional discovery and with
the rule changes designed to achieve it. (As we will see later, they also
invite expense shifting under Rule 37(a)(5) and sanctions under Rule
26(g).)
It is understandable that lawyers find comfort and efficiency in forms
and routines. Departing from past practices is riskier than simply
repeating the practices that seemed to work just fine before. Lawyers are
hardly immune from the pull of “CYA” thinking. That pull is especially

33.
34.

See GENSLER, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 6.
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES AND COMMITTEE ON
RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES ON
THE 2010 CONFERENCE ON CIVIL LITIGATION 4 (2010), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/
default/files/report_to_the_chief_justice.pdf [https://perma.cc/R83F-YNRM] [hereinafter REPORT
ON 2010 CONFERENCE ON CIVIL LITIGATION].
35. See Campbell, supra note 21 (discussing the major goals of the 2015 amendments).
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strong when junior lawyers mimic the behavior of their senior-lawyer
supervisors. And there is certainly no reason that lawyers should reinvent
the wheel in every case, drafting every interrogatory and every document
request from scratch. (More on that in a moment.) But too often lawyers
serve the same set of cookie-cutter-cover-the-landscape-scorched-earth
discovery requests in every case, making no effort to tailor the requests to
fit the needs of the individual case. Making no effort, in the terms of the
2015 amendments, to be proportional. Making no effort, in plain English
terms, to be reasonable. The response, predictably, is boilerplate
objections. The predictable result of boilerplate requests and objections
are the lawyers’ and litigants’—and judges’ and legislators’—complaints
about discovery abuse and the costs and delays it imposes.
Sometimes lawyers crank out their “standard” sets of discovery
requests because they are unsure at the start of the lawsuit of what they
will actually need or how best to get it. But there is a better way to achieve
individual-case-tailored (and therefore proportional) discovery. That is
for the parties to communicate with each other, early, to identify the issues
about which they most need information and to use that information to
establish discovery priorities. The Advisory Committee Notes to the 2015
amendments to Rule 26 emphasize how important it is for parties to use
the Rule 26(f) discovery-planning conference to communicate with each
other about what discovery they need, why they need it, and the burdens
of providing it. 36 The amendment to Rule 1 to promote party cooperation
during the discovery process makes clear that this type of candid exchange
is an important part of making the discovery process work effectively for
all. 37
The amendments also encourage judges to get involved in managing
discovery early, to try to address problems before they reach full bloom. 38
The amendments underscore this by encouraging judges to hold “live”
Rule 16 initial pretrial conferences and using them to tailor discovery to
the particular case. In his 2015 Year-End Report, Chief Justice Roberts
highlighted the benefits that accrue when judges “take on a stewardship
role” and actively manage their cases from the outset, including the

36. FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment.
37. See FED. R. CIV. P. 1 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment (“Effective advocacy
is consistent with—and indeed depends upon—cooperative and proportional use of procedure.”).
38. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment.
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enhanced ability to “determine the appropriate breadth of discovery, and
curtail dilatory tactics, gamesmanship, and procedural posturing.” 39
Those three themes—cooperation, proportionality, and active case
management—combine to provide practical solutions to the boilerplate
discovery problem. Lawyers act differently when they know they are
being watched. Lawyers prepare differently when they know they will be
before judges willing to work—indeed, insistent on working—with
lawyers who have thought about their cases and the discovery they need
and want, to craft case-specific proportional discovery plans. Lawyers are
less likely to churn out boilerplate discovery requests or assert boilerplate
objections when they know they will have to explain them to the judge at
a live Rule 16 initial case-management conference.
C.

“Patterns” Can Be Good! Using Discovery Protocols to Promote
Fairness and Proportionality.

Long experience has taught the rulemakers that there are limits to
what changing rule text can accomplish. In their Report to the Chief
Justice on the 2010 Duke Conference, the Advisory Committee and the
Standing Committee outlined a three-pronged plan to address the
problems identified during the Conference. 40 One prong, of course, was
to follow up on ideas for possible rule changes; that work led directly to
the 2015 amendments. 41 A second prong focused on identifying more and
better opportunities to educate judges and lawyers about the benefits of
cooperation, proportionality, and active case-management. 42 A third
prong entailed working with stakeholders of all types—including judges,
bar organizations, legal reform groups, and academics—to develop
specific techniques and mechanisms that would complement the Advisory
Committee’s reform efforts. 43 One of the ideas mentioned favorably in the
report was a project already underway to develop “pattern” discovery
requests for specific categories of litigation. As the Report explained,
“[s]uch pattern discovery requests would be presumptively
unobjectionable and could save both sides time and money, and spare the
court some of the skirmishing that now occurs.” 44
39. 2015 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 10-11
https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2015year-endreport.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R6ZV-C9KL].
40. REPORT ON 2010 CONFERENCE ON CIVIL LITIGATION, supra note 34, at 4.
41. Id. at 5-10.
42. Id. at 10-11.
43. Id. at 11-12.
44. Id. at 10-11.
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During the following year, a nationwide committee of experienced
employment law attorneys, balanced between plaintiff and defense
attorneys, worked with Judge John Koeltl and Judge Lee Rosenthal to
draft the Initial Discovery Protocols for Employment Cases Alleging
Adverse Action (Employment Case Protocols). 45 The lawyers negotiated
to identify categories of information and documents that lie at the core of
discoverable information in any adverse action case. Under the
Employment Case Protocols, the parties must provide the specified
information and documents to the other side at the start of the case without
waiting for a formal request and without interposing objections. 46 There
is no need to wait because requests for such core material are inevitable,
and there is no need for objections because the categories were identified
and drawn to ensure that the information and documents would be
relevant and proportional. The Employment Case Protocols were
endorsed by the Civil Rules Advisory Committee but the choice whether
to use them was left to individual judges and districts.47
The Federal Judicial Center (FJC) reported on the success of the
Employment Case Protocols in October 2015. 48 At that time, the
Employment Case Protocols had been adopted by about 75 federal judges
across the country. The FJC found that the incidence of discovery
motions—either motions to compel or motions for protective orders—had
been cut nearly in half. 49 This finding was “consistent with the hypothesis
that the pattern discovery required under the pilot was effective in
reducing discovery disputes and perhaps reducing costs—assuming, that
is, that fewer motions correspond with lower costs overall.” 50 In other
words, as predicted, requiring lawyers to turn over the obviously relevant
and proportional discovery materials without delay and without a fight

45. See PILOT PROJECT REGARDING INITIAL DISCOVERY PROTOCOLS FOR EMPLOYMENT
CASES ALLEGING ADVERSE ACTION 1 (2011), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/
2012/DiscEmpl.pdf [https://perma.cc/7F3W-49R8].
46. Id. at 6-9.
47. Id. at 4 (“The Initial Discovery Protocols for Employment Cases Alleging Adverse Action
is a proposal designed to be implemented as a pilot project by individual judges throughout the United
States District Courts. The project and the product are endorsed by the Civil Rules Advisory
Committee.”).
48. See Emery G. Lee III & Jason A. Cantone, Report of Pilot Project Regarding Initial
Discovery Protocols for Employment Cases Alleging Adverse Action (2015),
https://www.fjc.gov/content/309827/report-pilot-project-regarding-initial-discovery-protocolsemployment-cases-alleging [https://perma.cc/MU7G-PWRY].
49. Id. at 1.
50. Id. at 4.
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streamlined the discovery process and avoided opportunities for
gamesmanship. 51
The success of the Employment Case Protocols has led to the
development of protocols designed for other types of cases. In January
2018, the FJC made available on its website the Initial Discovery
Protocols for Fair Labor Standards Act Cases Not Pleaded as Collective
Actions (FLSA Protocols). 52 Like the Employment Case Protocols, the
FLSA Protocols were the product of lengthy discussions involving
experienced lawyers from both sides of the “v.” The model is the same.
The FLSA Protocols identify categories of information and documents
that the parties must produce at the start of the lawsuit without waiting for
a formal discovery request, and generally prohibit objections other than
for attorney-client privilege or work-product protection. 53 And the goal is
the same. By having the parties produce the core discovery information
up front and without a fight, the parties can bypass the typical wasteful
early posturing and skirmishing. The parties instead can focus on the
merits, including determining what, if any, additional discovery might be
needed. Efforts are underway to expand the set of available Protocols to
other areas, including insurance cases.
For an article in which the prevailing theme is “boilerplate” is “bad,”
it may seem odd to encounter a section promoting the use of “pattern”
discovery practices. Not to us. Something becomes boilerplate not
because it is used repeatedly but because it is used thoughtlessly. As Judge
Grimm once put it, boilerplate discovery is discovery that is conducted
“reflexively but not reflectively.” 54 By this measure, the Protocols should
not be viewed as a form of “good” boilerplate because they should not be
viewed as boilerplate at all.
The Protocols show that lawyers do not need to reinvent the wheel
in every case to achieve thoughtful and proportional discovery. The
defining characteristics of boilerplate are lack of thought and lack of effort
to make sure that the words in question are used for a reason and not just
out of habit or for CYA. The Protocols work precisely because of all the
good thought and effort that went into their making. They are “pattern”
but not boilerplate because they are tailored in advance to meet the
specific needs of those cases. The cases in the categories covered by the
51.
52.

Id. at 2.
See INITIAL DISCOVERY PROTOCOLS FOR FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT CASES NOT
PLEADED AS COLLECTIVE ACTIONS (Jan. 8, 2018), https://www.fjc.gov/content/327796/initialdiscovery-protocols-flsa-2018 [https://perma.cc/36HL-55A2].
53. Id. at 6-9.
54. Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs. Co., 253 F.R.D. 354, 358 (D. Md. 2008).
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Protocols assert similar legal theories and involve similar fact patterns.
The lawyers that developed them used their experience to identify the
basic information that parties need to exchange in every case. The
Protocols are the result of an enormous amount of reflection on the
discovery needs of those types of cases, resulting in a discovery process
that is more tailored and more focused, not less.
III. WHAT CAN JUDGES DO WHEN FACED WITH BOILERPLATE
DISCOVERY?
Recently, a small but growing cadre of judges has taken a firm stand
against boilerplate, making clear that they will no longer look the other
way and warning of consequences ranging from automatic waiver to
significant sanctions. Some of the landmark cases and other unpublished
cases of note from the last ten years have much to teach. We add to those
lessons a few observations and recommendations of our own.
A.

The Landmark Cases

Perhaps the most prominent and influential of the modern antiboilerplate cases is Judge Paul Grimm’s decision in Mancia v. Mayflower
Textile Services Co. 55 Judge Grimm, then a magistrate judge, had been
referred motions to compel to resolve on memorandum and
recommendation. While reading the briefs and accompanying materials,
Judge Grimm concluded that both parties had likely violated their
discovery obligations. 56 The plaintiffs had sought excessive boilerplate
discovery and the defendants had responded with boilerplate objections.
Rather than rule on the briefs, Judge Grimm held a live hearing on the
motions. 57 He used the hearing to explain how the lawyer cows ate the
discovery cabbage and violated the discovery rules. Judge Grimm neither
ignored the violations, nor promptly issued sanctions. Instead, he told the
parties that their best option would be to start genuinely communicating
with each other and cooperating to get the discovery they needed done
fairly, efficiently, and cost-effectively. 58 As Judge Grimm would
elaborate in his written opinion following the hearing, cooperating did not
mean giving in on legitimate differences over the boundaries of relevance,
or privilege, or proportionality. Cooperating meant giving up posturing,
inflexibility, and an insistence on getting everything at the outset or on
55.
56.
57.
58.
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providing nothing, ever. The opinion memorialized Judge Grimm’s
guidance for the bar (and bench) generally.
Judge Grimm’s Mancia opinion brought to center stage an all-butforgotten part of Rule 26 introduced 25 years earlier in 1983: Rule 26(g).
Under Rule 26(g), the attorneys who sign discovery papers certify that the
contents—whether they are requests, responses, or objections—are
warranted by the circumstances, not interposed for an improper purpose,
and proportional to the needs of the case. 59 Rule 26(g) was intended to be
the discovery equivalent of Rule 11, requiring lawyers to “stop and think”
before serving or responding to discovery requests. 60 If applied as
intended, Rule 26(g) might be enough to prevent lawyers from churning
out the same old discovery requests and boilerplate objections in every
case, regardless of need, cost, or burden. Under Rule 26(g), if applied as
intended, parties would look at each case individually and determine
whether their requests and objections were warranted and appropriate.
The plaintiffs in Mancia, Judge Grimm wrote, likely had violated Rule
26(g) by sending “kneejerk discovery requests.” 61 The defendants had
almost certainly violated Rule 26(g) by responding with kneejerk
objections. As Judge Grimm explained, making boilerplate objections
constitutes “prima facie evidence of a Rule 26(g) violation” because they
show that the lawyer did not take the time to determine whether any
particularized grounds for objecting in fact existed. 62
Judge Grimm noted that technically the defendants had waived their
right to object to the plaintiffs’ discovery requests, permitting the court to
order responses to the requests as written “regardless of cost or burden.” 63
But Judge Grimm recognized the tension between doing that and the
court’s duty to limit excessive discovery. 64 He did neither, electing instead
to send the parties off to try again in light of his instructions and guidance.
In doing so, he provided two final lessons. First, he examined the claimed
justification of adversarial zeal and refuted the suggestion that a lawyer’s
duty to his client excuses lawyers (or the parties) from complying with
their discovery obligations and limits.65 Second, he predicted that if the
lawyers simply spent some time talking and listening to each other, they
59. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g).
60. FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 1983 amendment. See also Richard L.
Marcus, Reducing Court Costs and Delay: The Potential Impact of the Proposed Amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 66 JUDICATURE 363, 364-65 (1983).
61. Mancia, 253 F.R.D. at 358.
62. Id. at 359.
63. Id. at 364.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 360-62.
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could avoid many expensive, time-consuming discovery battles and better
serve their clients. 66
Boilerplate objections were also at the center of Judge David Horan’s
decision in Heller v. City of Dallas. 67 In that case, Judge Horan tackled a
series of motions to compel filed against the City of Dallas. The City’s
discovery responses contained the trifecta of boilerplate: (1) they began
with a long list of blanket general objections that appeared in every
discovery response spit out by the lawyers’ word processor; (2) the
responses to individual requests contained boilerplate objections with a
similar provenance; and (3) these responses stated that answers would be
given or documents produced “subject to” the boilerplate objections stated
at the beginning and in the response to every question. 68 This time it was
the plaintiffs who invoked Rule 26(g), moving to compel and for
sanctions. 69
Following Judge Grimm’s lead in Mancia, Judge Horan began his
analysis in Heller with a lengthy discussion of the Rule 26(g)
requirements and purpose. With that foundation, Judge Horan turned to
the City’s responses. Judge Horan first held the blanket “General
Objections” to be a form of improper boilerplate because the City did not
even try to link them to any particular discovery request. 70 Judge Horan
characterized the City’s boilerplate general objections as “worthless,”
“meaningless,” and “a waste of time for opposing counsel and the
court.” 71 He instructed the City to “cease and desist” from similar
responses in the future. 72 But he declined to impose Rule 26(g) sanctions
because “the existing legal authority is not entirely consistent across the
federal courts and has not always been clear as to the propriety of raising
these kinds of general objections.” 73
Judge Horan then turned to the City’s repeated statement that its
every response was “subject to” and “without waiving” its boilerplate
objections. 74 Judge Horan characterized this as a “confusing” and
“misleading” way to prevent the other side from knowing whether
anything was in fact withheld based on any objection. 75 But here too he
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
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declined to impose Rule 26(g) sanctions, because he did not think the case
law condemning the practice was sufficiently clear to warn lawyers. The
practice appeared to have been passed along from lawyer to lawyer and
had acquired undeserved legitimacy, raising fairness concerns if he tried
to deter future misconduct by punishing the past behavior. 76
Judge Horan did impose Rule 26(g) sanctions for the City’s third
type of boilerplate violation. In its responses to individual requests, the
City repeated—as if chanting a mantra—generalized and unsupported
assertions of overbreadth, undue burden, and vagueness. Judge Horan
found that the City’s refusal to answer any part of the discovery requests
on the basis of these boilerplate objections violated Rule 26(g). The
absence of any effort to tie the objections to specific flaws in particular
requests showed that the City had failed to take any steps to make sure the
objections were warranted before asserting them. 77 Judge Horan found
that the case law made abundantly clear that this type of patently
boilerplate objection was wrong, wrong, and wrong. Judge Horan ordered
the City to pay the plaintiffs the attorney’s fees they incurred in obtaining
discovery over those objections. 78 In doing so, Judge Horan rejected the
argument that the lawyers shouldn’t be sanctioned for conduct that has
become common in practice, instead stating “that simply highlights the
need to call this conduct out when it is presented and to provide a deterrent
through a sanction, as the Federal Rule mandates here.” 79
Judge Mark Bennett also made headlines in the national legal press
when he took on boilerplate objections. Judge Bennett asked in Liguria
Foods, Inc. v. Griffith Laboratories, Inc., why good lawyers seemed to be
“addicted to ‘boilerplate’ discovery objections.” 80 The question arose as
Judge Bennett was preparing for a hearing on a discovery motion. He
looked at responses attached to the motion. Seeing what appeared to be
violations from all sides, he ordered the parties to submit their discovery
requests and responses, under seal. 81 His suspicions were confirmed.
Judge Bennett made a helpful chart showing the apparent violations and
ordered the parties to show cause why they should not be sanctioned,
setting a hearing on the discovery motion and the show-cause order and

76. Id. at 486-90.
77. Id. at 490-92.
78. Id. at 494-95.
79. Id. at 494.
80. 320 F.R.D. 168, 170 (N.D. Iowa 2017). This case is actually Judge Bennett’s second
significant decision condemning boilerplate objections and imposing sanctions under Rule 26(g). See
St. Paul Reinsurance Co., LTD. v. Commercial Financial Corp., 198 F.R.D. 508 (N.D. Iowa 2000).
81. Liguria Foods, 320 F.R.D. at 172.
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requiring the lawyers who had signed the discovery responses to appear
in person to explain their conduct. 82
The lawyers for both sides tried to argue—unsuccessfully—that their
use of boilerplate was proper because they had been acting in good faith
and had not specifically intended to cause undue expense, burden, or
delay. 83 But when pressed, they had to admit that they did not actually
believe that their boilerplate objections were acceptable.84 When asked
why they engaged in behavior they knew was improper, their candid
answers revealed the problem. They did it because that was how they were
trained, both by their own mentors and by what they saw other lawyers
do. 85 They did it out of the CYA fear—the lawyers’ paranoia about
waiving any objection that might be available, in some universe or set of
possibilities, however remote. 86 And they did it because they
anticipated—with reason—that the other side would do it to them. Both
sides feared that obeying the discovery rules would put them at a
competitive disadvantage. 87 A perverse golden rule applied. The lawyers
argued that they did what they acknowledge the rules prohibited because
that was what everyone else did and what everyone expected would be
done. Boilerplate objections were accepted as “the culture” of discovery,
and judges had helped by letting this culture develop to the point of
entrenchment.
Judge Bennett then said what he thought about what the lawyers had
done. He began with an overview of the rules, starting with the general
requirements of Rule 26 and then turning to the fact that both Rule 33 and
Rule 34 require lawyers to state discovery objections “with specificity.” 88
Failing to make a proper objection, he added, waived any unspecified
ground for objecting, both under the language of Rule 33 and, by judgemade extension, under Rule 34. 89
Turning to the content of the parties’ objections, Judge Bennett
quickly concluded that generalized objections about relevance and
burden, without any explanation, failed the specificity requirement and
constituted impermissible boilerplate. 90 Judge Bennett added that
82. Id. at 173-79.
83. Id. at 180.
84. Id. at 181.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 182-85. Judge Bennett was writing in 2017, so the 2015 amendment adding the
explicit specificity requirement to Rule 34 had taken effect.
89. Id. at 185.
90. Id. at 185-86.
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responding to interrogatories or production requests “subject to”
generalized boilerplate objections compounded the violations. 91 The
responses made it unclear whether any information or documents were
withheld on the basis of the boilerplate objections and, if so, what was
withheld, and why.
Finally, Judge Bennett squarely rejected the argument that using
boilerplate objections was justified to avoid waiver. To the contrary, the
judge ruled boilerplate objections and responses made “subject to” those
objections were no response at all. 92 Boilerplate objections were waivers.
No objection was preserved. A reflexive effort to preserve all possible
objections waived every objection. 93
Because boilerplate objections were so clearly improper under Rules
33 and 34 and established case law, Judge Bennett did not doubt his
authority to impose sanctions under Rule 26(g). 94 He was hesitant to do
so, however, because the lawyers had acted professionally in all other
respects and had acknowledged the error of their ways. 95 He was also
unwilling to punish the lawyers for following the “‘culture’ of
protectionist discovery responses.” 96 While he strongly encouraged the
lawyers to follow through on their promises to become agents for
changing the culture, Judge Bennett declined to impose sanctions under
Rule 26(g) for the past rule violations that the culture had produced. 97
Enough, however, was enough. Going forward, Judge Bennett
declared, things would be different. They would have to be different
because that would be the only way to change the “culture of
‘boilerplate.’” 98 Lawyers would have to break their addition to boilerplate
objections. Those who kicked the habit would have to call other lawyers
on it and go to the judge if needed. And the judges needed to “push back,
get our judicial heads out of the sand, stop turning a blind eye to the
‘boilerplate’ discovery culture and do our part to solve this cultural
discovery ‘boilerplate’ plague.” 99 To do his part, Judge Bennett
announced that he was amending his standing case-management order to
ban the use of boilerplate objections. He ended the opinion with this
message: “NO MORE WARNINGS. IN THE FUTURE, USING
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 186.
Id. at 187.
Id.
Id. at 188-89.
Id. at 189-90.
Id. at 190.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 191.
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‘BOILERPLATE’ OBJECTIONS TO DISCOVERY IN ANY CASE
BEFORE ME PLACES COUNSEL AND THEIR CLIENTS AT RISK
FOR SUBSTANTIAL SANCTIONS.” 100
Other judges have also taken a stand. In Fischer v. Forrest, Judge
Andrew Peck found it necessary to “issue a discovery wake-up call” to
the lawyers practicing in his court, because a year after the 2015
amendments took effect, he still was seeing boilerplate objections and
statements that discovery responses were made “subject to” general
objections. 101 Describing the changes made by the 2015 amendments to
Rule 34, Judge Peck issued this warning:
The December 1, 2015 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure are now 15 months old. It is time for all counsel to learn the
now-current Rules and update their ‘form’ files. From now on in cases
before this Court, any discovery response that does not comply with
Rule 34’s requirement to state objections with specificity (and to clearly
indicate whether responsive material is being withheld on the basis of
the objection) will be deemed a waiver of all objections (except as to
privilege). 102

In Blemaster v. Sabo, Judge John Sedwick encountered an especially
egregious example of boilerplate nonsense. The discovery response stated
just about every imaginable generic objection, all made “insofar as” or “to
the extent” they applied, and all while purportedly preserving the right to
provide actual answers later and subject to the “objections.” 103 Judge
Sedwick struck the objections and ordered the offending party to serve
amended responses specific to the discovery requests. Citing Liguria
Foods, Judge Sedwick ordered the offending party to pay the other side
the attorney’s fees incurred in challenging the boilerplate objections as a
sanction for violating Rule 26(g). 104
In BankDirect Capital Finance, LLC v. Capital Premium Financing,
Inc., Judge Jeffrey Cole called out the defendant for making “virtually
identical, boilerplate objections” to several of the plaintiff’s discovery
requests. 105 Judge Cole lamented the continued “unabated” use of
boilerplate objections, despite “courts’ repeated admonitions that these
sorts of ‘boilerplate’ objections are ineffectual.” 106 Like Judge Bennett,
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
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Id. at 192.
No. 14 Civ. 1304, 2017 WL 773694, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2017).
Id. at *3.
No. 2:16-cv-04557, 2017 WL 4843241, at *3 (D. Ariz. Oct. 25, 2017).
Id. at *4 (citing Liguria Foods, 320 F.R.D. at 172).
No. 15 C 10340, 2017 WL 5890923, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 29, 2017).
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Judge Cole acknowledged the complicity of the judiciary: “[n]eedless
judicial tolerance of the rote, boilerplate answers that have been employed
here will engender their continued use to the detriment of the goals sought
by the discovery rules.” 107 Like Judge Bennett, Judge Cole drew on the
lesson of “[l]ong and bitter experience . . . that only a refusal to accept” 108
boilerplate responses to discovery requests will lessen their use and
overcome this obstacle to proportionality and reasonableness in
discovery.
Some judges address the problem in advance, in an order sent out
when a civil case is filed, setting out what the judge expects of the lawyers.
These orders typically include something like the following instruction:
All parties are expected to frame their interrogatories, document
requests, deposition notices, and requests for admission to meet the
relevance and proportionality requirements of Rule 26(b)(1). Parties
may not ask for more than what is needed for the case, or object and
refuse to produce what is needed for the case, for strategic or tactical
reasons. 109

These orders typically emphasize the rules’ prohibition on boilerplate
requests and objections.
An example order follows:
Boilerplate objections in response to discovery requests are prohibited.
Parties may not simply raise or list rote or general objections. Parties
may not include a “Preamble” or a “General Objections” section stating
that the party objects to the discovery request “to the extent that” it is
vague, ambiguous, overly broad, or unduly burdensome. Instead, as the
2015 Civil Rule amendments make clear, objections to discovery
requests must be specific and tied to particular discovery requests. The
objections must clearly state the objections that actually apply to that
request.
A party who objects to a discovery request and also responds “subject
to the objections” must also indicate whether the response is complete,
that is, whether additional information or documents would have been
provided but for the objections. A party may not object and state,
“Subject to these objections and without waiving them, the response is
as follows. . . .” Instead, the response must also specifically identify

107. Id. at *3.
108. Id.
109. PROCEDURE FOR CASES ASSIGNED TO THE HONORABLE LEE ROSENTHAL 7 (2018),
http://www.txs.uscourts.gov/sites/txs/files/lhr_procedures.pdf [https://perma.cc/RS8T-LQAB].
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whether any information is withheld based on the objections and, if so,
provide enough information about what is not produced to enable further
inquiry if appropriate.
Similarly, a party may not merely state that some of the information is
produced and more will be provided later. Instead, the party must state
whether more information will be produced later, and when—either by
the requested date or by another specified reasonable date. 110

These requirements, repeated in the court’s procedures order, trace back
to the 2015 amendments to Rule 34(b)(2)(C). 111 This ban on boilerplate
or general objections is so useful for proportional discovery that it applies
to all forms of discovery requests, not only to Rule 34 requests for
production. 112
B.

A Few Additional Observations

We are tempted to say “ditto” and move on. The decisions discussed
above say it well. The 2015 rule changes, orders setting out the judges’
expectations for party compliance, and a few opinions warning of the
sanctions and waiver consequences of future violations are necessary
steps. But they are not sufficient. Parties must take heed. Judges must pay
attention to what the parties do. And judges must enforce the rules and
case-law requirements if violations persist.
To state again what is both obvious and obviously often ignored—
boilerplate requests and objections violate Rules 26(g), 33, and 34. Rules
33 and 34 require that parties respond except to the extent a specific
objection is made. When a request is objectionable only in part, the
responding party must respond to any parts not specifically objected to.
Because boilerplate objections are not specific, they do not relieve the
party of any duty to respond to any part of the request. A lawyer who signs
a discovery response with boilerplate objections in lieu of answers
knows—and should be held to knowing—that this violates the discovery
rules.
The theme of Rule 26(g) is that lawyers must “stop and think” about
what they are doing. A lawyer cannot mindlessly dump boilerplate
objections into discovery responses because “that’s how I was trained” or
because “that’s what everyone does.” If there are genuine grounds for
110. Id. at 8.
111. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(C); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee’s note to 2015
amendment.
112. See PROCEDURE FOR CASES ASSIGNED TO THE HONORABLE LEE ROSENTHAL 7 (2018),
supra note 109, at 8.
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objections, they must be stated specifically. If no specific grounds can be
identified, the objection cannot be made. If a specific objection is made to
part of a request, the lawyer must provide the information not covered by
the objection. Lawyers can’t have it both ways by stating that their general
objections are stated only “to the extent” they apply, or that they are
responding “subject to” them. That practice—now officially disapproved
by the 2015 amendment to Rule 34—makes the objection even less
specific, less clear, and less meaningful, not more. Lawyers practicing in
federal court must be held to knowing that “subject to” responses are just
as invalid under the rules as the boilerplate objections that spawned them.
The use of boilerplate objections also warrants sanctions under Rule
37(a)(5). When a court grants a motion to compel, Rule 37 requires the
court to award expenses (including attorney’s fees) to the prevailing party
unless the losing party’s conduct was “substantially justified.” 113 While
this may seem like a “loser pays” mechanism, it was not intended to
operate that way, and judges don’t use it that way. The mechanism was
intended to makes judges “stop and think” about the parties’ conduct that
led to the dispute and to determine whether that dispute arose because of
a legitimate disagreement or because one or both of the parties took an
indefensible position. 114 Under this standard, boilerplate objections
should also lead to expense shifting under Rule 37(a)(5). A party cannot
defensibly claim that its boilerplate objections justified not making a
substantive response to any part of the request. In short, parties that stand
on boilerplate objections should, at the least, expect to pay the other side’s
expenses when they are called out in front of the court.
The Rule 37(a)(5) expense-shifting scheme raises an interesting
question about overlapping remedies. If boilerplate objections lead to an
attorney’s fee award under Rule 37(a)(5), is that an effective response to
the problem, making the additional use of Rule 26(g) an act of judicial
overkill? The answer, sadly, is no.
To start, Rule 26(g) makes it a separate remedy that can be raised
either by party motion or by the court on its own. 115 In Heller, the plaintiff
invoked Rule 26(g). 116 But in Liguria and Mancia, it was the judge who
first raised Rule 26(g) in addressing a motion to compel. 117 A second look

113. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(5).
114. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a) advisory committee’s note to 1970 amendment. See GENSLER, RULES
AND COMMENTARY, supra note 6, at 1047.
115. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g) (stating that a court may act “on motion or on its own”).
116. See Heller v. City of Dallas, 303 F.R.D. 466, 469 (N.D. Tex. 2014).
117. See Liguria Foods, Inc. v. Griffith Labs., Inc., 320 F.R.D. 168, 172 (N.D. Iowa 2017);
Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs. Co., 253 F.R.D. 354, 364-65 (D. Md. 2008).
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at those cases suggests some reasons why Rule 26(g) deserves its place as
a freestanding remedy and why judges should not leave the punishment
and deterrence task to Rule 37(a)(5) expense-shifting alone.
First, judges should be (and are) free to examine the entirety of the
parties’ discovery conduct, not just those acts or events that precipitated a
motion to compel or for sanctions, or both. In Liguria, for example, Judge
Bennett saw the first signs of a problem when he examined the materials
attached to motions to compel. 118 But it was only when he ordered the
parties to submit all of their discovery requests and responses for his
review that he could see how pervasive the boilerplate usage was on both
sides. 119
Second, judges should be (and are) free to respond to abusive
discovery practices in ways not limited to ruling on specific discovery
motions. In Mancia, for example, Judge Grimm ordered the parties to go
back to the discovery drawing board and try again, this time actually
talking and listening to each other. 120 Though Judge Grimm did not
impose sanctions under Rule 26(g), it would have been appropriate for
him to do so if the motion to compel that brought the matter to his attention
in the first place was instead moot.
Third, the range of sanctions available under Rule 26(g) is broader
than the expense shifting Rule 37(a)(5) authorizes. Rule 37(a)(5) speaks
only of expense shifting, but Rule 26(g)(3) states that the judge may
impose any “appropriate sanction.” 121 This “may include an order to pay
the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, caused by the
violation.” 122 We might expect judges to select expense shifting in most
Rule 26(g) situations, but other sanctions may be more appropriate instead
of, or in addition to, expense shifting. In Heller, for example, in addition
to requiring the objecting lawyers, who were with the City’s legal
department, to pay the other side’s attorney’s fees, Judge Horan ordered
the City itself to circulate the order he issued to all of its attorneys who
litigate in federal court. 123
Fourth, limiting judges to expense shifting when granting motions
challenging discovery responses would empower parties to use boilerplate
118. Liguria Foods, Inc., 320 F.R.D. at 172.
119. Id. at 173-80.
120. Mancia, 253 F.R.D. at 364-65.
121. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g)(3).
122. Id.
123. Heller, 303 F.R.D. at 495. Judge Bennett did something similar in a Rule 26(g) case from
2000 when he ordered the offending lawyer to write a bar journal article condemning the use of
boilerplate objections. See St. Paul Reinsurance Co., LTD. v. Commercial Fin. Corp., 198 F.R.D. 508,
518 (N.D. Iowa 2000).
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objections as an obstructionist tactic, knowing they might well avoid
paying the other side’s fees—and any other consequence—so long as they
changed their tune if the other side brought it up before filing a motion to
compel. 124 Parties must know that their boilerplate tactics can be
sanctioned even if they withdraw the objections or particularize them
later. Otherwise, the rule will be a one-free-bite rule, allowing lawyers to
start with boilerplate objections to see if they can get away with it. At a
minimum, delay and some added cost will result.
Finally, sanctions under Rule 26(g) are just that—sanctions. Expense
shifting is different. It makes the other side whole and only incidentally
punishes the offender. As judges have observed, solving the boilerplate
problem requires culture change. Sanctions carry consequences for
lawyers that expense-shifting orders alone do not. While judges must
exercise care in sanctioning—a heavy-handed approach is neither needed
nor desired—the path to culture change requires a strong message.
Sanctions cannot be off limits.
There is one last issue to consider. The rules and the case law make
it clear that a party responding to discovery requests with boilerplate
requests or objections forfeits the right to make legitimate, specific
objections. The question is whether judges should rely on waiver as their
default mechanism to break lawyers of their boilerplate habits. We think
waiver has an important role to play but should be viewed as an option
rather than an automatic consequence.
Automatic waiver as a first-line response has at least two problems.
First, waiver is no punishment when the party who interposed boilerplate
objections had no valid objections to begin with. 125 Second, if the
discovery requests were at all objectionable, then finding that improper
responses waived the right to object means that the resulting discovery
will exceed the Rule 26(b)(1) boundaries. If the “extra” discovery extends
only a little beyond what would ordinarily be tolerated, it is hard to get
too exercised. But what if the information sought would clearly exceed
relevance or proportionality, or both? 126 As Judge Grimm observed in
Mancia, 127 judges have an independent duty to keep discovery in check.
There is a third reason as well. The remedy for one party’s discovery-rules

124. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(1).
125. The sting might come, however, if the problem was raised by a motion to compel and the
judge, in addition to finding waiver, ordered expense shifting under Rule 37(a)(5).
126. See Ashford v. City of Milwaukee, 304 F.R.D. 547, 549 (E.D. Wis. 2015) (declining to
read an automatic waiver penalty into Rule 34 because it could lead to a party being punished by
having to spend a lot of money to engage in disproportionate document production).
127. See Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs. Co., 253 F.R.D. 354, 364 (D. Md. 2008).
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violation should not be to allow the other party to operate outside the rules.
The proverb that two wrongs don’t necessarily make a right applies.
Perversely, finding waiver can reward the offending lawyer, who now gets
to conduct discovery—and bill the client for conducting discovery—that
otherwise would not have been allowed.
Courts should enforce the waiver rule that is stated in Rule 33 and
that courts properly read into Rule 34. But courts should consider waiver
as one option, along with expense shifting under Rule 37(a)(5) and other
sanctions under Rule 26(g), and carefully choose the best option for the
circumstances. Expense shifting may be most likely to send the right
message and, because it is tied to the misconduct, the most likely to be
calibrated to the offense. Judges will learn, with lawyers, the least onerous
sanction required to be effective. What it means to be “effective” here is
explored next.
IV. WHAT WILL IT TAKE TO BREAK THE BOILERPLATE HABIT?
The Federal Rules are now clear, if they weren’t before, and more
emphatic than they were before: no more boilerplate requests or
objections. A few judges have made it clear that they will enforce the
Rules. No more looking the other way. No more warnings. Keep it up,
lawyers, and you will be facing sanctions, including waiver (or, more
precisely, forfeiture). Will this be enough to purge boilerplate from
modern pretrial practice? If not, what will?
These questions require a deeper look at some of the forces that have
combined to make boilerplate discovery so addictive. Some of those
forces are structural and can be traced back to larger policy choices that
are unlikely to be revisited in the name of eradicating boilerplate. But
other forces are cultural. They can be changed. The key to changing them
is the judiciary. No matter how strident their opinions, no matter how dire
their warnings, and no matter how severely they sanction the lawyers who
appear before them, three, or six, or a dozen vocal federal judges scattered
across the country will not change the culture that keeps lawyers addicted
to boilerplate. But 60 might. Two hundred would help. The more judges
joining the less the burden on any one of them, and the faster the tipping
point is reached.
A.

Understanding the Boilerplate Problem

The habit—the culture—of boilerplate requests and objections did
not happen overnight. It developed over time, growing and gaining force
until it became routine and then expected. We have already discussed the
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tools that judges have to fight back against the culture of boilerplate. But
what conditions led these boilerplate practices to develop in the first
place? Perhaps the answer to the boilerplate problem lies in changing the
conditions that gave rise to it, rather than punishing those who succumb
to its siren call.
Structurally, the most significant factor behind the rise of boilerplate
culture has been the policy choice embedded in the discovery rules to have
written discovery operate extrajudicially. Interrogatory practice under
Rule 33 was always designed to operate extrajudicially, presumptively
without judges’ involvement. Parties ordinarily do not need a judge’s
permission to serve interrogatories. 128 That reflects a belief that most
interrogatories will be within the proper boundaries of discovery, making
it inefficient to have judges scrutinize all interrogatories in advance. When
interrogatories go beyond those boundaries in a particular case, parties are
deputized to protect themselves by the power to object. To make the
power of self-protection meaningful, the rules provide that the objection
suspends the duty to respond to the objectionable request, unless and until
a court says otherwise. 129 The result, however, is that the scheme gives
responding parties the power to put the brakes on written discovery—at
least for the time being—simply by saying “no.”
Document discovery practice under Rule 34 has operated on the
same extrajudicial principle since 1970, but it wasn’t always that way.
From its adoption in 1938 until 1970, Rule 34 did not permit parties to
serve document requests unilaterally. 130 For 32 years, the rule required
parties to seek leave of court and show good cause to serve their proposed
128. See FED. R. CIV. P. 33(a)(1) (stating that leave of court is required only if the number of
interrogatories exceeds the default limit of 25).
129. In the written discovery context, the objection must suffice as the answer if a party is to be
able to protect itself from harms like lack of relevance and undue burden. The objection would be
pointless if a party had to incur the expense of investigating and responding to overbroad or
disproportionate interrogatories or document requests despite the objection. But it must be understood
that it is a policy choice; there is no immutable law that says that objections must suspend the duty to
respond. Compare deposition practice under Rule 30, for example, where most non-privilege
objections are for the record and do not justify a refusal to answer the question. See FED. R. CIV. P.
30(c)(2) (stating that “the testimony is taken subject to any objection” and restricting instructions not
to answer to three situations).
130. See 8B CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 2205 (3d ed.
2010) (discussing deletion of the good cause requirement). As originally enacted, Rule 34 provided
in pertinent part: “Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefore and upon notice to all
other parties, the court in which an action is pending may (1) order any party to produce and permit
the inspection and copying or photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any designated
documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects, or tangible things, not privileged,
which constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the action and which are in
his possession, custody, or control.” 7 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, 34 App.01 (3d ed. 2017).
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document requests. If the putative recipient thought the proposed request
was improper, the recipient could object before the request was issued.
The judge had to determine whether the requesting party showed good
cause before granting leave. In 1970, however, Rule 34 was amended to
eliminate the preclearance requirement. The extrajudicial model of Rule
33 was applied to Rule 34. 131 Starting in 1970, Rule 34 became subject to
the same self-protection model that governed Rule 33, giving birth to a
whole new set of opportunities to make boilerplate requests and
objections. 132
The current scheme has virtues. It operates well in many cases.133
But it comes with an inherent and probably unavoidable risk that parties
131. That change was precipitated by the first major empirical study conducted on behalf of the
Advisory Committee. In the early 1960s, the Advisory Committee enlisted the help of the Columbia
University Project for Effective Justice to gather empirical data on the functioning of the pretrial
discovery scheme. See William A. Glaser, Pretrial Discovery and the Adversarial System, 45 IND. L.
REV. 435 (1968) (discussing the history and design of the study). The report was submitted in
February 1965 and was used by the Advisory Committee when it developed the 1970 amendments.
See Advisory Committee’s Explanatory Statement Concerning Amendments of the Discovery Rules,
Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Relating to Discovery, 48 F.R.D. 487,
489 (1970). The Study showed that document discovery under Rule 34 had been relatively problem
free, leading the Advisory Committee to conclude that judicial involvement was not needed. See FED.
R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee’s note to 1970 amendment. The irony is that the Study showed that
interrogatory practice under Rule 33 was rife with problems. See FIELD SURVEY OF FEDERAL
PRETRIAL DISCOVERY: REPORT TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 12
(1965) (“[T]he research findings show that [interrogatories] generated far more litigant complaints
than any other discovery device.”). Even then, concerns were raised that perhaps the reason there was
less discord under Rule 34 was that parties, knowing the judge had to sign off, didn’t overreach, and
that removing the judge from the picture would lead to the same problems that had been plaguing
interrogatory practice under Rule 33. See Glaser, supra, at 222.
132. See Paul W. Grimm & David S. Yellin, A Pragmatic Approach to Discovery Reform: How
Small Changes Can Make a Big Difference in Civil Discovery, 64 S. C. L. REV. 495, 509-10 (2013)
(“[T]he 1970 amendments . . . led directly to the current environment, in which discovery is carried
out, in the first instance, entirely free from any judicial oversight and is limited, in a practical sense,
only by the attorneys carrying it out.”).
133. According to a 2009 survey conducted by the FJC, lawyers reported that the amount of
discovery conducted in their cases was “just right” in about 60% of their cases. See Emery G. Lee III
& Thomas E. Willging, FED. JUD. CTR. NAT’L, CASE-BASED CIVIL RULES SURVEY 27 (2009). That’s
certainly good news. Some, however, have cited those statistics as proof that the 2015 amendments
were not needed. We have always disagreed with that contention and still do. The fact that the scheme
was working reasonably well in most cases led the Advisory Committee to reject the idea that the
scheme needed to be “blown up” and replaced with something much different. But even under the
FJC study’s data (and there were other surveys at the time that painted a less favorable picture), the
lawyers reported disproportionate discovery costs in about 25% of their cases. Id. at 28. Moreover,
the FJC’s study also reported that approximately 25% of the lawyers believed that “discovery is
abused in almost every case in federal court.” Id. at 71. The Advisory Committee’s objective after the
2010 Duke Conference was to identify possible changes that would help to cure the problems in the
cases where they existed without disturbing what was working well overall. That philosophy of
always striving for improvement traces back to Charles E. Clark, who advocated making marginal
improvements where possible and who championed the creation of a standing Advisory Committee
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will abuse the opportunities to ask for overbroad discovery and to forestall
responding to any discovery by objecting. That’s not new news to the
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules or to the Standing Committee. They
know. In 1946, the Advisory Committee amended Rule 33 to provide that
objecting to one interrogatory did not suspend the need to answer other
interrogatories. 134 The Advisory Committee explained that “[u]nder the
original wording, answers to all interrogatories may be withheld until
objections, sometimes to but a few interrogatories, are determined.” 135
The amendment expedited interrogatory procedure and helped eliminate
the strike value of objections to minor interrogatories. 136 The Advisory
Committee faced a similar incentive problem with Rule 33 in 1970. At
that time, interrogatory answers were due within 15 days, but objections
had to be made within 10 days (i.e., 5 days before the answers would have
been due). 137 The rulemakers found that this timing scheme “seem[ed]
calculated to encourage objections.” 138 Faced with a mere 15 days to
investigate and prepare meaningful responses, lawyers began making
objections during the earlier 10-day period “as a means of gaining time to
answer.” 139 And because “Rule 33 imposes no sanction of expenses on a
party whose objections are clearly unjustified,” it was “easier to object
than to seek an extension of time.” 140 To address the problem, the
rulemakers changed the due date for both answers and objections to 30
days, expecting that allowing 30 days to investigate and respond would at
least reduce the practice of making unjustified objections to buy time. 141
Thirteen years later, the Advisory Committee added Rule 26(g) in yet
another effort to cut back on the tactical advantage too many lawyers tried
to gain by making reflexive and unjustified objections. 142 The more things
changed, the more they stayed the same.
Second, discovery practice under Rules 33 and 34 is influenced by
the commitment to another foundational policy—the American Rule.
Parties presumptively bear their own discovery expenses. 143 The point is
precisely because he believed that the rules would be in need of constant tending and adjustment to
keep up with changes in the law and legal practice. See Steven S. Gensler, Ed Cooper, Rule 56, and
Charles E. Clark’s Fountain of Youth, 46 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 593, 601-10 (Winter 2013).
134. FED. R. CIV. P. 33 advisory committee’s note to 1946 amendment.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. FED. R. CIV. P. 33(a) advisory committee’s note to 1970 amendment.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. FED. R. CIV. P. 33(b)(2).
142. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g) advisory committee’s note to 1983 amendment.
143. See Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 358 (1978).
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as important as it is obvious. The party requesting discovery isn’t paying
to get it. The cost of serving boilerplate requests is almost nil. Responding
parties spend their own money, time, and other resources to research
interrogatories and document requests and to find and formulate answers,
or to locate, review, and produce responsive documents, all for the
“benefit” of the other side. In cases in which one side has little to discover
and the other side has much, the cost disparity is commensurately larger.
Objections, particularly prefabricated objections stored in the computer,
cost nothing. They provide no information that can come back to haunt.
The illusion of warding off waiver adds to the temptation to use
boilerplate first and think later. The lure of responding with a fast and
cheap “no” and worrying about the consequences tomorrow is hard to
resist. As Scarlett O’Hara learned, over and over again, it seems much
easier to think about the hard stuff tomorrow. Both the rules and the judges
applying them must be strong enough to counteract the seeming tactical
advantages of stonewalling.
Any effort to break lawyers of their boilerplate addiction must take
account of the factors that have fueled the problem (or at least provided
cover for opportunistic offenders). Consider again the candid answers the
lawyers gave to Judge Bennett when he asked them why they consistently
made boilerplate requests and objections that nobody could defend.144
Boilerplate is engrained in the practice by decades of ubiquitous,
uncorrected use. As new lawyers, what did they see in the work of the
lawyers they worked with and learned from? Boilerplate. What did they
see in the work of opposing counsel? Boilerplate. If a new attorney in a
litigation practice, schooled only in the classroom and eager to learn how
to practice “in the real world,” had drafted discovery responses for a senior
attorney and omitted the boilerplate, isn’t it likely that the draft would
have come back to the new attorney with instructions to add in the
“protective,” “standard,” general objections? New lawyers, already
fearful of making a mistake, are afraid not to climb on board the
boilerplate bandwagon when they view it as an essential form of CYA.
The ubiquitous, uncorrected use of boilerplate feeds on itself.
Lawyers who might otherwise follow the rules may feel that doing so will
put them at a competitive disadvantage. As one of the lawyers in Liguria
put it, nobody wants to engage in “unilateral disarmament.” 145 If everyone
is doing it, then nobody is in a position to challenge it. In Liguria, it was

144.
145.
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the judge who ended up throwing the flag on both sides. 146 All the lawyers,
and often their clients, had become acculturated into thinking that
boilerplate objections were standard operating procedure.
Finally, judges must acknowledge—as some have—their role in
letting the boilerplate habit become engrained. Looking the other way is,
to use an overused term, a form of enablement. When judges make it clear
that they dislike resolving discovery disputes and expect the lawyers to
“work it out among themselves,” they all but invite—or at least sorely
tempt—lawyers to misbehave, knowing that the other side will think long
and hard before making an issue of it. In that environment, what lawyer
would risk the judge’s ire by taking a hard stand against the other side’s
use of boilerplate? And when boilerplate requests or objections are
brought to the judges’ attention in discovery motions, too often judges err
on the side of leniency and do not impose expense shifting or any sanction
at all. Perhaps judges feel a sense that, having figured out what discovery
to allow or require, the problem has been solved. But if that is the worstcase scenario, then that leaves the party who sought overly aggressive
discovery, and the party who interposed the boilerplate objections, no
worse off than they would have been had they asked for what they really
needed and objected only to what was legitimately objectionable in the
first place. In that environment, lawyers might predictably feel as though
they have nothing to lose by requesting more than they need or can justify,
or responding with boilerplate objections, and seeing if the other side lets
it slide.
B.

Are Sanctions the Answer? Or at Least an Answer?

When looking for solutions to a problem, sanctions are not usually a
good place to start. Other options usually hold greater promise. 147 But
sometimes sanctions are at least an essential part of an effective solution,
if not the only solution. This is one of those situations. Without a
meaningful message and deterrent, the cultural factors that promote
boilerplate that can be changed are unlikely to change.

146. Id. at 180.
147. The most significant practical problem with using sanctions to change behavior is that
doing so relies on enforcement. The perceived threat of sanctions must be great enough to overcome
the perceived benefit of the behavior to be deterred. That requires not just that the available sanctions
be sufficiently severe, but that sanctions are in fact consistently and sufficiently imposed lest wouldbe offenders discount the threat as unlikely to actually happen to them. In general, it is preferable to
find a way to eliminate the incentive to break the rule than to rely on costly enforcement to overcome
the incentive.
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Written discovery will continue to follow the extrajudicial model. 148
The party-managed discovery approach and the American Rule aren’t
going anywhere. There is likely not much more that can be done by
tweaking the rules. The rules already require requests to be proportional
and objections to be stated with specificity. The rules already give lawyers
ample tools to call out offenders and give judges ample authority to deal
with them. 149 The problem isn’t one of rule content. It is one of fidelity
and enforcement, and, here, enforcement begets fidelity.
The problem of boilerplate discovery practices set in over time.
Indeed, it set in during our lifetimes. First it became grudgingly tolerated;
it was frustrating, but often not worth the effort to fight. Then it became
acceptable; why resist the urge when everybody else seemed to be doing
it. Then it became expected; if you didn’t do it, you were fighting with
one hand tied behind your back. And with that, the vicious circle was
complete. Everyone was doing it because . . . everyone was doing it.
What will it take to break the cycle? The occasional opinion or
order—however pointed and scathing—is unlikely to change the
boilerplate culture. The lawyers on the receiving end may be chastened
and may reform, at least in front of that court or judge. But other lawyers,
or the lawyer who got the lecture who is in front of a different court, may
calculate the odds of that happening to them as exceedingly small and
continue with business as usual. 150 Law schools can’t solve the problem
by lecturing students about the evils of boilerplate and “proper” discovery
practices. That’s not to discourage law schools from teaching students
civility, cooperation, proportional behavior, and the rules themselves. But
law school is not where lawyers learn litigation practices. And whatever
good lessons students learn in law school will be soon forgotten if what
they see in practice—both from the lawyers on the other side and the
lawyers they practice with—is more and more boilerplate. 151
148. While there have been occasional calls to return to pre-clearance for document requests,
we do not believe the rulemakers are seriously entertaining that type of reform at this time.
149. Indeed, the two most applicable rules—Rule 26(g) and Rule 37(a)(5)—presumptively
require judges to take action by requiring the imposition of sanctions and expense-shifting
respectively unless the judge finds that the violation was substantially justified.
150. For example, one wonders whether the lawyers in Liguria were unaware that Judge Bennett
had previously written a scathing condemnation of boilerplate objections and imposed sanctions on
the offending lawyer under Rule 26(g), see St. Paul Reinsurance Co., LTD. v. Commercial Fin. Corp.,
198 F.R.D. 508, 518 (N.D. Iowa 2000), or whether they were aware but calculated that the odds of a
similar fate befalling them were sufficiently small to take the risk.
151. To the point, most schools have cut their first-year, and only required, Civil Procedure class
from six to four or even three credit hours. Yes, Civil Procedure is now on the multistate bar exam,
but day-one lawyers surely don’t learn discovery practices in bar review courses. It is the “practical”
topics like discovery that get cut from the syllabus to make things fit. Perhaps the movement toward
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What is needed is a response by the judicial community. Not one
judge. Not ten. Hundreds. A response by the many, not the few. A critical
mass. That would put things in motion.
Lawyers will stop making boilerplate requests and objections when
they start to believe that judges won’t let them get away with it.152 Imagine
what would happen if lawyers came to realize that the judicial responses
they read about in the legal press—the ones that were newsworthy
precisely because they seemed like outliers—had become the norm. Law
firms and in-house corporate and government legal departments would
change their approaches, both in terms of what they consider acceptable
practice for their lawyers and, most importantly, in how they train and
instruct their new lawyers. Individual lawyers would heed Rule 26(g) and
“stop and think” rather than reflexively recycling past discovery requests
or dumping their boilerplate objections into their responses. At the same
time, individual lawyers would feel empowered to break their own
boilerplate habits without the fear of unilaterally disarming. The power
comes from a realistic hope that opposing counsel will do the same and
secure in the knowledge that judges will deal appropriately with those
who have not. Finally, lawyers who have broken the boilerplate habit will
be able to challenge those who have not, no longer forced into silence by
their own unclean hands.
Judges can do three things to avoid relying solely on sanctions to
make this happen. First, judges can make clear to lawyers from the outset
what is expected. One way is in an order sent in every case, at the outset,
making the judges’ expectations clear. Second, judges must make
themselves available, when needed, to promptly and effectively resolve
discovery disputes when they arise. And third, judges must apply and
enforce the rules, responding to or raising violations and addressing them.
What judges can do includes sanctioning when the behavior warrants it
and deterrence demands it.
***
It is not hard to imagine a day in the not-too-distant future when
boilerplate discovery stands out like a sore thumb because it is the outlier,
not the norm. Culture change is hard, but it often occurs with remarkable
experiential learning will provide opportunities for students to learn proper discovery practice, but
only for those students who elect to take those upper-level classes.
152. See Chief Justice Menis E. Ketchum II, supra note 2 (“Stiff sanctions by judges for each
violation would have a dramatic effect on these unauthorized boilerplate objections. The word would
spread quickly, and the practice would suddenly stop.”); Matthew L. Jarvey, Boilerplate Discovery
Objections: How They Are Used, Why They Are Wrong, and What We Can Do About Them, 61 DRAKE
L. REV. 913, 932 (2013) (“In order to curb boilerplate objections, judges should be more willing to
dole out sanctions against lawyers who abuse the discovery process by issuing these objections.”).
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speed when it does happen. Culture change occurs when tipping points
are reached. Here, we are talking about two culture changes. The first is
the culture of acceptance, or perhaps indifference, among too many judges
who have turned a blind eye. The second is the boilerplate culture that
exists among lawyers, the belief that everybody does it, so you must do
the same. If we can get to the tipping point for the first change, we will
get to the tipping point for the second faster than your device can cut,
paste, and save yet another set of abusive discovery requests or objections.
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